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nographer, but not by the defendant. 
The child was openly frightened of 
the defendant, therefore, the judge 
concluded that the child was not 
emotionally prepared to testify in 
open court before the defendant. 
Accordingly, the judge decided that 
a two-way television should be used 
in such a way that both the child and 
the defendant could see one another 
without actual confrontation. 
Gilbert's motion fora new trial was 
denied and he received a fifteen year 
prison sentence. Craig, 588 A.2d at 
336. Gilbert appealed, but before 
the court of special appeals had an 
opportunity to decide the case, the 
court of appeals issued a writ of 
certiorari. Id. at 337. 
The defendant claimed that the 
trial judge erred in permitting the 
section 9-1 02 procedure without first 
examining the child victim testify-
ing in the presence.ofthe defendant. 
Id. at 338. Nevertheless, the court 
of appeals upheld the trial court 
judge's findings, basing its decision 
on two rationales: (1) the trial court 
judge did not have the guidance of 
Craig I nor Maryland v. Craig, 
which favors the initial interview in 
front of the defendant; and (2) the 
court ruled that it was within the 
trial court judge's discretion whether 
or not to allow the defendant to be 
present. Id. at 338-39. 
In summary, Gilbert's case was 
decided differently than Craig's 
due to the trial court judge's per-
sonal examination of the child prior 
to her testifying. The judge made a 
case-specific finding, and concluded 
that the child was unable to testify in 
open court without subjecting her-
selfto serious emotional trauma. Id. 
at 339. 
Craig and Gilbert established a 
set of guidelines, not a rigid for-
mula, for trial court judges to follow 
in child abuse cases. The ruling in 
Craig leaves a tremendous amount 
of discretion in the hands of the trial 
court judge. Gilbert indicates that 
so long as the trial judge makes an 
individualized evaluation of the 
child's emotional health, his or her 
decision to implement section 9-
102 will be upheld. These cases 
demonstrate an effort to provide fur-
ther guidelines in child abuse cases, 
and in so doing, the court of appeals 
has pushed the right of confronta-
tion to its constitutional limits in an 
all out effort to protect abused chil-
dren. 
- Andrew S. Kasmer 
Board of Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell: FEDERAL COURT 
SUPERVISION OF PREVI-
OUSL Y SEGREGATED 
SCHOOLS MAY BE TERMI-
NATED IF SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE WITH DE-
SEGREGATION OBJEC-
TIVES HAS BEEN ATTAINED 
In Board of Oklahoma City v. 
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991), the 
United States Supreme Court pro-
mulgated a standard for dissolving 
desegregation decrees. Specifically, 
the Court ruled that a federal district 
court may lift a desegregation de-
cree if a school district can show 
that it has complied with the decree 
in good faith and that vestiges of 
past discrimination have been elimi-
nated to the extent practicable. If a 
decree is to be terminated or dis-
solved, the parties are entitled to a 
detailed statement to that effect from 
the court. 
In 1972, the Board of Education 
of Oklahoma City was ordered to 
adopt a court-supervised desegre-
gation plan involving busing. This 
plan was designed to integrate the 
schools in its district and end de jure 
segregation. After complying with 
the desegregation decree for five 
years, the Board moved in 1977 to 
end court supervision of the plan. 
After finding that the Board had 
substantially complied with the con-
stitutional requirements and that lack 
of court supervision would not be 
detrimental to the unitary system 
the Board had achieved, the district 
court terminated its jurisdiction in 
the case. 
In 1984, the Board adopted the 
Student Reassignment Plan (SRP). 
This plan was designed to alleviate 
greater burdens placed on blackchil-
dren caused by demographic changes 
in the area that resulted in longer 
busing routes. In 1985, the respon-
dents, black students and their par-
ents, asked the district court to re-
open the case, contending that the 
school district had not achieved ''uni-
tary" status and that SRP was a 
return to segregation. Id. at 634. 
The district court refused to re-open 
the case, holding that its 1977 find-
ing that the school system was ''uni-
tary" was res judicata and that the 
school system had remained uni-
tary. Id. The Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit reversed, and held 
thatthe 1977 orderdidnotterminate 
the original injunction. Id. 
The court of appeals remanded 
the case for the district court to 
determine if the injunction should 
be lifted or modified. On remand, 
the district court vacated the injunc-
tion because it found that the previ-
ously ordered desegregation plan 
was unworkable dueto demographic 
changes, the school district had 
maintained its unitary status, and 
that the SRP was not designed with 
discriminatory intent. Id. at 634-35. 
The Court of Appeals again re-
versed. Id. at 635. Relying on 
United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106 
(1932), the court ruled that the in-
junction should remain in effect until 
the school district could show that 
its existence was causing a "griev-
ous wrong evoked by new and un-
foreseen conditions." Dowell, 111 
S. Ct. at 635 (quoting Swift, 286 
__________________________ 22.//fhe Law Forum - 29 
U.S. at 119 (1932». The Supreme 
Court granted the Board's petition 
for certiorari and reversed. 
In the majority opinion written 
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the Court 
first considered whether the respon-
dents could contest the 1977 order 
disso 1 ving the desegregation decree. 
The Board argued that the 1977 
finding ofunitariness barred the re-
spondents from challenging the or-
der. Id. at 635. Because the lower 
courts inconsistently used the term 
''unitary,'' confusion arose in inter-
preting the 1977 order. As a result, 
the Court held that when a desegre-
gation decree is to be terminated, all 
parties are "entitled to a rather pre-
cise statement" to that effect from 
the court. Id. at 636. 
In its analysis, the Court focused 
on the standard for dissolving de-
segregation decrees and placed great 
weight on the nature of injunctions 
issued in desegregation cases. In 
distinguishing the nature of the Swift 
injunction on which the court of 
appeals had relied, the Court recog-
nized that "federal supervision of 
local school systems was intended 
as a temporary measure to remedy 
past discrimination." Id. at 637. 
Accordingly, the Court found that 
dissolution standards, which applied 
to other injunctions that were de-
signed to operate in perpetuity, were 
not the proper standards to apply to 
desegregation decrees that were tem-
porary by their very nature. Id. 
The Court held that after local 
authorities had complied with the 
desegregation decree for a "reason-
able period of time," the decree's 
dissolution was proper. Id. In deter-
mining a school district's compli-
ance with desegregation decrees, the 
court first must conclude that the 
school board had "complied in good 
faith with the desegregation decree 
since it was entered." Id. at 638. 
In deciding the question of good 
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faith, "compliance with previous 
court orders is obviously relevant." 
Id. at 637. In this case, the Board 
complied with the decree from 1972 
until 1985. The Court held, there-
fore, that the court of appeals had 
erred in relying on United States v. 
W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 
(1953), for the proposition that 
"compliance alone cannot become 
the basis for modifying or dissolv-
ing an injunction." Dowell, 111 S. 
Ct. at 637. The Court also recog-
nized that the "grievous wrong" test, 
which the court of appeals gleaned 
from Swift, would place school 
boards under judicial supervision 
indefinitely. Id. at 638. This result 
conflicted with the purpose of schoo 1 
desegregation injunctions, which 
sought only to remedy past segrega-
tion, prevent future discrimination, 
and ultimately return schools to lo-
cal control. Id. 
Next, the Court instructed lower 
courts to determine if the "vestiges 
of past discrimination had been 
eliminated to the extent practicable." 
Id. In evaluating this criteria, the 
Court stated that consideration must 
be given not only to student assign-
ments, but also to "every facet of 
school operations - faculty, staff, 
transportation, extra-curricular ac-
tivities and facilities." Id. (quoting 
Green v. New Kent County School 
Board, 391 U.S. 430,435 (1968». 
On remand, the Court instructed 
the district court to determine (1) if 
the Board had complied in good 
faith with the desegregation decree 
since its imposition and (2) if the 
vestiges of past discrimination had 
been eliminated as far as practicable 
throughout every facet ofthe school 
district's operations. If the district 
court found that the Board was en-
titled to have the injunction lifted, it 
must then proceed to evaluate the 
SRPunderthemandatesoftheEqual 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. [d. 
In dissent, Justice Marshall, 
joined by Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens, sought a stricter standard 
than the majority for ending court 
supervised desegregation. Drawing 
on Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the dissenters 
argued that a decree should not be 
lifted while conditions likely to in-
flict the type of stigma identified in 
Brown still remained. So long as 
"racially identifiable schools" and 
other conditions likely to inflict such 
injury persisted, and while at the 
same timethere were feasible means 
of eliminating them, the dissenters 
would not terminate desegregation 
decrees. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
The decision in Board of Educa-
tion of Oklahoma City v. Dowell set 
down standards for dissolution of 
desegregation decrees, thus making 
it easier for school districts cur-
rently under supervision to be set on 
their own again. Under the new 
standards, a school system that was 
at one time segregated and subject 
to a desegregation order may have 
that order terminated upon a show-
ing that it has complied with the 
order in good faith for a "reasonable 
period oftime," has abandoned any 
discriminatory practices to the ex-
tent "practicable," and that it is un-
likely that the school system would 
again resort to discriminatory prac-
tices. 
- Robert D. Cole Jr. 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.: ALPHA-
BETIZED DIRECTORY 
LISTINGS CONSISTING OF 
SURNAMES AND TELE-
PHONE NUMBERS ARE NOT 
SUBJECT TO COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION. 
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